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Abstract
According to recent UN projections more than 50 percent of the growth in
world population over the next half century will be due to population growth in
Africa. Given this, any policy that influences African demography will have a
significant impact on the world distribution of income. In this paper we discuss
the potential for migration policies to affect fertility and education decisions,
and hence, population growth in Africa. We present the results from different
scenarios for more or less restrictive/selective migration policies and derive their
implications for the evolution of world inequality.
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In the next 10 years, there will be more than 100 million more
school-aged children in Africa. By the year 2050, more than a quarter
of the world workforce will be African. And in the next three gen-
erations, more than 40 percent of the entire world youth will live in
Africa. This is not just a challenge. This is an extraordinary oppor-
tunity, not just for Africans but for the world.
Secretary of State John Kerry, May 25th 2013, African Union 50th Anniversary
Summit.
1 Introduction
In his address to the African Union on the occasion of its 50th anniversary, Sec-
retary of State John Kerry was referring to the recently released United Nations
Population Division forecasts for the next century. The UN is now projecting
that the world population will keep growing throughout the rest of the century
and will reach nearly 11 billion by the year 2100. These figures differ markedly
from their previous projections released four years ago, which showed a milder
increase. In any event, such projections necessarily rely on a number of assump-
tions that are by nature disputable and that have been widely criticized recently.
For example, Deutsche Bank economist Sanjeev Sanyal suggested that population
growth for Africa was largely over-estimated due to a few but critical assump-
tions, notably the assumption of a stable long-run level of population (New York
Times, 2013a).
A general critique that can be addressed to demographic projections, and to
UN projections in particular, is that they tend to neglect the potential for eco-
nomic forces to shape demography. Typically, demographic projections do not
anticipate that economic forces can bring about major policy changes which, in
turn, affect the micro decisions of households when they choose the number and
education level of their children. A striking illustration of this is the recent relax-
ation of the one-child policy in China in response to age and gender imbalances
in the population that were judged by China’s authorities as compromising the
country’s growth and development prospects (New York Times, 2013b). Such
sudden policy changes will undoubtedly impact on the fertility, age structure and
eventually the population size of China; given that China is one of the largest
countries of the world in terms of demographic size, whatever affects demography
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in China has important repercussions for the distribution of the world population
and, hence, on the world distribution of income. The same applies to African de-
mography. Policy changes that affect African population growth will significantly
impact global inequality.
The UN projections are widely used by governments and international agen-
cies to design global policies addressing important issues such as global warming,
food security, energy security, as well as, of course, political and economic imbal-
ances. Our point, however, is not to propose another estimate of the world popu-
lation growth for the coming decades but to demonstrate the potential sensitivity
of such figures to changing policy environments. The policy we are interested in
is migration, that is, whether immigration policies in the advanced economies will
become more or less restrictive and whether they will become more or less selec-
tive. Indeed, the UN projections neglect the fact that as well as affecting the size
and composition of nations ipso facto migration also acts indirectly through the
interaction between migration and other households decisions regarding human
capital investment and fertility.
Migration can affect fertility through a number of channels, first and fore-
most by affecting the expected return to human capital and thereby the desired
education and number of children, see Docquier and Rapoport (2012). Recent
work has also emphasized a transmission of norms mechanism, whereby migrants
transfer social norms regarding fertility behavior from destination to home. This
has been analyzed for Egypt by Bertoli and Marchetta (forthcoming) and in
cross-country comparisons by Beine, Docquier and Schiff (2013). Using data on
internal migration in 19th century France, Daudin, Franck and Rapoport (2013)
further suggest that such a cultural diffusion channel played a significant role in
explaining the transmission of the fertility transition.
This paper emphasizes the quantity-quality trade-off framework in which de-
cisions about the number of children to raise, and how much education to give
them, is a function of the return to education and so is affected by the global de-
mand for skills and by the policies permitting labor to move across borders. The
quantity-quality trade-off has been shown to be an important factor in explaining
the demographic transition from the Malthusian to the Modern Growth regime
in the 19th century (see Galor, 2005). It is therefore natural to ask whether the
changes in the demand for skills will have significant effects on the fertility path
of today’s developing countries in the 21st century.
The paper which is most closely related to ours is a recent paper by Delogu,
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Figure 1: The density of log GDP per capita in the world economy holding
GDP per capita constant at 2010 levels while changing the distribution of world
population to that of the UN estimates in 2010 and 2050.
Docquier and Machedo (henceforth DDM) (2013). We view our paper as a com-
plement to their study in that it addresses the same topic but from a different
angle and using alternative underlying assumptions. In particular, the migra-
tion scenarios retained differ. DDM (2013) assume a full liberalization of the
movement of labor and so migration is modeled as an optimal location choice
where migration costs play a central role. In contrast in our model emigration
remains largely constrained and we assume there to be an excess supply of South-
North migrants and focus on the way changing emigration propensities affects the
quality-quantity trade-off for children and, thus, the relative size of nations. We
model immigration policy in two dimensions: the total degree of openness and
the degree to which immigration is selective.
The evolution of the African population will clearly have a direct effect on
the evolution of world income inequality. Figure 1 illustrates the effect of the
projected changes in world population on the world distribution of income by
plotting the density of the world distribution of income under the UN’s medium
variant population estimates for 2010 and 2050 while holding each countries’ GDP
per capita constant at their 2010 levels. The figure shows that according to the
UN projections, the populations of poorer countries will be growing relatively to
richer countries in the next half century and that this ceteris paribus will tend
to increase world inequality by increasing the density of the distribution at low
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income levels and decreasing it at higher income levels. However, as we argue
in this paper, all things are not equal. The evolution of the world population
distribution, and so of the world distribution of income, will be significantly
affected by changing economic incentives in the world economy over the next half
century.
2 Theoretical Framework
In this section we describe briefly the model underlying the simulations in section
4. The model is an extension of the overlapping generations model of Mountford
and Rapoport (2011) and so the discussion here will be brief. Please refer to
Mountford and Rapoport (2011) for a more detailed discussion.
In each period t, output Yt may be produced according to a Cobb Douglas
production function with two factors of production, skilled labor, Ht, and un-
skilled labor Lt, under perfect competition, where the levels of Ht and Lt are
determined endogenously by the optimal decisions of agents. Agents live for two
periods and are endowed with one unit of labor in their second period. Agents are
identical in all respects except for their level of ability, a, which we will assume is
distributed normally over the unit interval, i.e. as a truncated normal distribu-
tion, and independently of the ability level of their parent. If the agent becomes
skilled, then agent i can supply gt+ai efficiency units of skilled labor, where gt is
the annual rate of growth of technology. Otherwise the agent remains unskilled
and supplies one efficiency unit of unskilled labor. The level of technology, At,
in each period is given and technological progress from one period to the next is
related to the level of human capital accumulation in the economy and so is also
determined endogenously.
2.1 Individuals’ Decisions
In their first period of life individuals are dependent on their parent who decides
whether or not they become skilled. As described above, skilled individuals can
supply gt + ai efficiency units of skilled labor while those remaining unskilled
can supply only one efficiency unit of unskilled labor. Individuals make optimal
decisions over fertility, consumption and the training of their offspring and so
they optimally allocate their time between labor force participation and child
rearing. Denoting the time required to bring up skilled offspring as, τ s, and
the time required to bring up unskilled offspring as, τu, where we assume that
0 < τu < τ s < 1, the budget constraint of a member i of generation t, is
ct + w
i
t
(τ snH
t
+ τunL
t
) ≤ wi
t
for i = s, u (1)
4
where nH
t
and nL
t
are measures of skilled and unskilled offspring respectively.
2.2 Emigration
We will analyze the effects of permanent emigration on the sending economy.
We assume that the gap in TFP between the developed world and the less de-
veloped world is great enough that it is always the case that more agents would
like to emigrate than are able. We consider both skilled and unskilled emigration
and assume that the probability of emigration differs across skill. We assume
that probability of emigration is not affected by the level of ability but is only
affected by the skill level. Intuitively the loss of emigrating skilled agents will ce-
teris paribus reduce the level ht ≡
Ht
Lt
and that loss of unskilled agents will ceteris
paribus raise the level ht but the possibility of emigration will also increase the in-
centive to accumulate human capital and so the equilibrium effect may differ from
this intuition, see Mountford and Rapoport (2011) and earlier literature on the
brain drain (e.g., Mountford (1997), Beine, Docquier and Rapoport(2001,2008)
and Kanbur and Rapoport (2005)).
2.3 Equilibrium
In equilibrium total fertility, nt, is related to the total time devoted to fertility,
the relative costs of rearing skilled and unskilled children and the equilibrium
proportions of skilled, nH
t
/nt, and unskilled children, n
L
t
/nt, by the following
equation,
nt =
1− θ
τ s(nHt /nt) + τ
u(nLt /nt)
(2)
3 Baseline Scenario
We calibrate the above model using publicly available data on emigration rates,
education levels, population and fertility.1 We briefly detail below the data
1The two period overlapping generations framework is a simplifying abstraction which al-
lows for a tractable analysis of the theoretical model. However an implication of this is that
additional assumptions have to be made concerning the mapping of the empirical data into the
two period generational framework. An interesting direction of future study would be to extend
the analysis to a multiperiod overlapping generation model along the lines of Song, Storeslet-
ten, Wang and Zilibotti (2012) where agents live for up to J periods and maximize a utility
function given by
∑J
j=0 s
jβju(ct+j , dt+j) where s
j is the probability of surviving until period
J , β is the discount factor with u(ct+j , dt+j) defined as above. This would allow the model to
use the five yearly age specific fertility and mortality data from the United Nations Population
division, see http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Excel-Data/population.htm. However such analysis
is beyond the scope of the present paper.
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Figure 2: The UN Medium Variant Total Fertility for 48 African Economies.
Source: United Nations (2012).
sources used and the assumptions underlying the calibration choices. Our base-
line scenario is designed to broadly match the medium-variant UN Population
Projections for Africa (United Nations, 2012). We plot the projected fertility
(TFR) for African countries in Figure 2, which shows that a crucial underlying
assumption in these projections is that in the long-run, the population of each
country will be stable. Thus, as we see from the Figure 2, fertility for each country
is projected to quickly converge to a level of close to 2 in just a few decades.
Figure 3 shows the UN Projected Population for Africa under the three main
variants: high, medium and low-fertility. The medium fertility assumption, which
will be used as a benchmark throughout this paper, is the best prediction, as they
put it, based on probabilistic scenarios using updated demographic data (the high
and low-fertility scenarios, on the other hand, illustrate the robustness of the
projection to adding or subtracting half-a-child to the medium-variant scenario).
The main motivation for our study is to show how economic forces may in-
fluence the fertility and, ultimately, the population projections for Africa. In
particular, we want to investigate whether migration policies may impact the
demographic evolution of the African continent since, as demonstrated in our
theoretical model, emigration propensities (and differential emigration propen-
sities at different education levels) may affect the quality-quantity tradeoff for
children.
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Figure 3: The UN High Medium and Low Variant Projections for the growth of
African Population. Source:United Nations (2012).
3.1 Data
Population and fertility data come from the UN Population Division (UN, 2013).
Education data comes from Barro and Lee (2013) which provide data for the
share of males aged 25 and more with tertiary, secondary and primary education.
Our preferred definition of skilled agents is for those who have completed tertiary
education. For missing observations we impute values using an OLS regression
with per capita GDP, infant mortality and total fertility rates as regressors.
Emigration data comes from Bruecker, Capuano and Marfouk (2013), who
recently collected panel data on immigration stocks disaggregated by country of
origin and level of education for 20 OECD receiving countries. The Bruecker et al.
(2013) dataset provides seven observations between 1980 and 2010 for bilateral
immigrant stocks, broken down by gender and level of education for up to 195
origin countries, and it builds upon the methodology proposed by Docquier and
Marfouk (2005), Beine, Docquier and Rapoport (2007), Docquier, Lowell and
Marfouk (2009) and Defoort (2008). We use the bilateral data and then re-
aggregate by origin country to compute emigration stocks and rates by education
level for all African countries. Note therefore that our emigration variables are
intended to proxy for emigration from Africa to the OECD only (i.e., we exclude
intra-African and other South-South migration). The data sets provide sufficient
data for 48 African economies. For calculating total African figures we take
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Figure 4: The Evolution of Mean Migration Rates and Education Levels in Africa
account of missing countries observations by scaling up the total from our 48
economies using a scale factor that matches the total African population for 2010
data.
Figure 4 shows the evolution in these data of mean education and migration
rates in Africa over recent decades. The first panel shows how education comple-
tion levels have risen through time in all education categories. The second panel
shows that migration rates have also been growing through time for both low
skilled and high skilled migrants but that the migration rates for highly skilled
workers has been rising by more. This fact together with the rising share of highly
skilled workers in the labor force implies that the proportion of migrants in the
population has also been rising.
3.2 Calibration
We choose parameters in our model to match the UN projected population growth
medium variant by year 2030. More precisely, we make the following choices. We
follow Delogu et al. (2013) in setting the time-cost of raising an uneducated child,
τu, to be 0.0231 (or 3/130) in year 2000. Likewise, following Delogu et al. (2013),
we model the cost of uneducated children as increasing over time so that in our
case it equals 0.0312 in 2010, 0.0396 and 0.0594 in 2050. This increase represents
inter alia the declining opportunity for children to work due to, e.g., greater
minimum schooling obligations. Similarly, τ s is calibrated to decline over time
by 40% by 2030 and by a further 20% by 2050. This reflects inter alia the fact
that the cost of raising educated children (in time-equivalent units) is declining
due to projected increased public spending on education. The initial level of τ s
is calculated using equation (2) with the assumption that total education costs
are proportional to our measure of skilled workers. Given this, we then calibrate
the total time devoted to child rearing in each country so as to match the rate
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Figure 5: The Evolution of Total African Population in the Baseline Scenario
and the UN medium variant
of population growth in that country projected in the medium-variant of the UN
Population Projections in 2030. For this baseline scenario, we calibrate TFP in
2000 using the production function and assume that the TFP growth of African
countries is 2% above US TFP growth (i.e., there is some element of catching-up,
again as in Delogu et al. (2013)). Finally, emigration rates of both high- and
low-skill workers are as given by the 2010 figures in the Bruecker et al. (2013)
data set. We assume that the production function is time invariant and the
same in all countries and so different per capita output is caused by differences
in productivity and in factor supplies. Equipped with these parameters for all
48 countries we calculate the equilibrium a⋆ for each country and at each time
period as described in Section 2, which determines the model’s predicted share
of educated in the population and, thereby, fertility. We assume the distribution
of abilities is truncated normal with a mean of 0.95 and a variance of 1.
We display the calibration of our baseline scenario in Figures 5 and 6. In
Figure 5 we plot the model’s projected total African population growth with
that of the UN medium-variant scenario. This shows that we have chosen our
parameters so that the model matches very closely on aggregate the UN Medium
variant. In Figure 6 we plot the model’s projected population growth rate for
each of the 48 countries alongside the same graph for the UN medium variant.
While for individual countries the goodness of fit varies (see, e.g., Figure 8 below),
Figure 6 shows that the general shape is very similar, with both the model and
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Figure 6: The Population growth rate for 48 African Economies under the Base-
line scenario (left) and the UN Medium Variant (right)
the UN medium-variant scenario’s baselines having the characteristic that all
economies are tending towards a stable population in the long run.
4 Alternative scenarios based on different im-
migration policies
To investigate the role of immigration policies in affecting demography in Africa,
we examine three alternative scenarios: a scenario where emigration becomes
more skill biased; a scenario where emigration becomes more unskilled biased;
and a scenario where emigration is reduced. Clearly there are many possible
scenarios, but we focus on these three alternative scenarios to illustrate the main
economic forces at play in the model. For ease of illustration we assume large
differences in emigration rates across scenarios but in section 4.4 below we discuss
policy scenarios based on the current trends in migration rates and these show
the same qualitative responses although smaller in magnitude.
4.1 A High Skilled Biased - Brain Drain - Scenario
This can be thought of as the continuation of the recent evolution of immigra-
tion policies in OECD countries and the general tendency for them to become
increasingly restrictive and at the same time quality-selective, we assume that
increased restrictiveness translates into dividing by two the emigration rate for
low-skill workers while increased selectivity translates into increasing by a half
the emigration rate for high-skill workers. See Mountford and Rapoport (2011)
for a description of the recent policy changes in OECD economies.
The effect on the population growth in Africa of the skill biased emigration
scenario is shown in Figure 7. This shows that this policy has the effect of reduc-
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Figure 7: The Evolution of Total African Population Under Alternative Scenarios
ing the rate of population in Africa by nearly 370 million in 2050 compared to the
baseline scenario, and by 700 million 2070, which is a similar magnitude as be-
tween the medium and low variant’s of the UN population projections in Figure 3.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. The increased relative probability
to emigrate amongst high skilled workers increases their relative expected wage
and so induces families in African economies to rear more high skilled offspring
which via the budget constraint, equation 1, reduces total fertility.
Note also that the effect of this scenario is not spread equally across Africa
as shown in Figure 8. In an economy with a high rate of emigration, such as
Senegal, the effect of alternative scenarios are proportionately greater than in a
country with lower rates of emigration, such as for example, Zambia. Differences
occur because different countries have different migration rates and also different
proportions of educated people in the economy.
4.2 A Low Skilled Biased Scenario
In this scenario we assume by contrast that the high skilled emigration rate in
each country is 50% lower than in 2000 and that the low skilled emigration rate
is 50% higher. This can be thought of as a scenario where globalization, perhaps
via the increased bargaining power of multinational corporations has reduced the
ability of countries to implement a restrictive immigration policy. As Figure 7
shows, this policy has the effect of increasing the rate of population in Africa
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alternative scenarios
by nearly 900 million in 2050 compared to the baseline scenario, which is about
twice the order of magnitude as differences between the UN medium and High
and Low variants as shown in Fig 3.
4.3 A Reduced Migration Scenario
This scenario shows that even a general reduction in migration will affect the
rate of population growth. Intuitively this is because the African economies
have a lower growth rate and so a lower autarkic demand for skilled agents than
developed economies. Hence a move towards autarky has the effect of reducing
the incentive of households to have fewer, more costly, skilled offspring rather than
larger numbers of unskilled offspring and so projected population is higher than
under the baseline scenario although not as high as in the low skilled emigration
biased scenario as shown in Figure 7.
4.4 Policy Scenarios Based on Current Migration Trends
The scenarios above were designed to highlight the potential importance of eco-
nomic forces rather than describe reality. In this section we use historical emi-
gration rates to calibrate the scenarios. The results which are displayed in Table
4.4, while smaller, have the same qualitative features as the scenarios above.
The historical rates of emigration growth are shown in Figure 4. This shows
that within our sample the high skilled emigration rate has increased by about
7% by decade and the low skilled emigration rate by 26% a decade, albeit from a
low base. We use these rates when calculating our scenarios. In our ”Continued
Emigration Growth Scenario” we assume that the emigration rates of each type
of labor continues to grow at these historical rates. In the ”Skill-Bias Emigration
Growth Scenario” we assume that the emigration rates of skilled labor continues
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TABLE 1
African Population (in Billions) Under Alternative Scenarios
Date Baseline Continued Skill-Bias Unskilled-Bias
Scenario Emigration Growth Emigration Emigration
2030 1.56 1.56 1.53 1.60
2050 2.25 2.22 2.08 2.43
2070 3.06 3.01 2.62 3.55
This table shows the effect of different migration scenarios on the evolution of African population
as discussed in the text.
to grow at its historical rate but that unskilled emigration remains at its 2010
level. In the ”Unskilled-Bias Emigration Growth Scenario” we assume that the
emigration rates of unskilled labor continues to grow at its historical rate but that
skilled emigration remains at its 2010 level. The results show that as above a
skilled bias growth of emigration would lead to a reduction in African population
by about 7.5% relative to baseline scenario in 2050 and 14% in 2070. Conversely
an unskilled bias growth of emigration would lead to an increase in African popu-
lation by about 8% relative to baseline scenario in 2050 and 16% in 2070. If both
unskilled and skilled labor continue to grow at their historical rates then these
opposing effects offset each other so that the population relative to the baseline
scenario only falls by 1.6%.
5 Conclusion
As Secretary of State John Kerry’s speech to the African Union makes clear, the
evolution of world inequality depends significantly on the evolution of fertility,
human capital accumulation and population growth rates in Africa. This paper
has shown how economic forces which affect the relative returns to skilled and
unskilled labor - in particular migration propensities - can have significant effects
on the evolution of African economies and thereby on the world distribution of
income. The model we have presented here is highly stylized and so its precise
numbers should not be taken too literally. However what the model has shown is
that there are good reasons to believe that current trends in the African economy
imply that migration policies may have a large leverage on the evolution of African
economies.
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